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I.

INTRODUCTION

Environmental degradation poses an existential threat to
humanity.1 The United States has enacted criminal statutes in an attempt to delay climate change, but its approach to environmental
law, regulation, and enforcement has been described as reactive,
heavily influenced by large corporate interests, and underwhelming.2
Additionally, regulation and enforcement are complicated by the
political nature of federal and state agencies and wild shifts in
environmental policy.3 For instance, the controversial Keystone XL
oil pipeline was denied a permit by the Obama administration in
2015, only for the Trump administration to approve the permit in
2017, and the Biden administration to cancel the permit in 2021.4
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Despite the threats posed by environmental degradation, there is
still very little research on the prosecution of environmental crime.5
Two recent articles, each by Joshua Ozymy and Melissa Jarrell, attempt to shed light on this subject by examining thirty-seven years of
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) case summary reports on
criminal investigations.6 Both articles are written using the same
data, with the first article, published in 2020, focusing on victimization7 and the second article, published the following year, focusing
on enforcement.8 Both articles are reviewed in this Article.
II. ARTICLE SUMMARIES
A. Exploring the Role of Victims in Federal Environmental
Crime Prosecutions, 1983–2019
Most environmental crimes in the United States go unnoticed and
unpunished.9 This is, due, at least in part, to how environmental
victimization is different than other sorts of crime, the difficulty in
prosecuting environmental cases, and the lack of public attention or
knowledge.10 For instance, the EPA, the federal agency charged with
building, pursuing, and recommending environmental cases for
prosecution, is given substantial power. However, the EPA routinely
chooses to forgo the criminal process and, instead, to settle most
cases civilly.11 Since the EPA primarily pursues cases civilly, there is
little reliable data on offenders and victimization, which makes studying and evaluating environmental crimes particularly difficult.12 Additionally, environmental crimes are largely ignored by both the mass
media and the public.13
The silent nature of environmental victimization and the financial
and time costs associated with prosecution contribute to the EPA’s
5

Joshua Ozymy & Melissa L. Jarrell, A Knowing Violation: Exploring the
History of the Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law in the Midwestern United
States, 10 CHI.-KENT J. ENV’T & ENERGY L. 60, 61 (2021); Michael J. Lynch, The
Sentencing/Punishment of Federal Environmental/Green Offenders, 2000-2013, 38
DEVIANT BEHAV. 991, 991–95 (2017).
6

Joshua Ozymy & Melissa L. Jarrell, Exploring the Role of Victims in Federal
Environmental Crime Prosecutions, 1983–2019, 57 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 25, 31–32
(2020); Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 61.
7

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 31.

8

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 61–62.

9

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 26–28.
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Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 27–29.
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civil strategy.14 The EPA chooses to reserve the criminal process for
cases involving significant harm, repeat violations, and those with
clear culpability.15 This likely encourages further crimes, as many
businesses knowingly violate environmental statutes due to lack of
enforcement and potential profit.16 The EPA typically pursues a
compliance monitoring strategy, rather than an active enforcement
policy, which means the EPA is dependent on self-reporting or thirdparty reporting, and, thus ignores many violations.17 Violations must
also meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is
difficult for environmental crimes, and is a major contributing factor
in the EPA deciding to pursue most cases civilly where a lower
burden of proof is required.18
Most criminological research has also neglected the study of
environmental crimes, instead focusing on street crimes.19 This focus
is evident in large, well-funded, and nationally representative
surveys.20 For instance, the National Crime Victimization Survey
(NCVS) does not collect any information on environmental crime
victimization.21 Lack of victimization data is particularly concerning
given that research suggests an estimated 40% of yearly global
deaths can be attributed to environmental factors.22 Research also
shows that people view environmental crimes as victimless and are
more likely to imagine crime in relation to street crime than an
environmental offense.23 Thus, environmental crime researchers
have had to broaden their definition of environmental or “green
crimes” to include any illegal acts that cause harm to humans,
animals, and the natural environment.24 This conception of harm better reflects environmental crimes and is more encompassing of
victimization, but not enough work has been done to develop a
meaningful victimization typology.25
To evaluate the role of victimization in environmental crime
prosecutions, Ozymy and Jarrell examined EPA case summaries to
14

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 28.
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Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 28.

16

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 28.
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Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 29.
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Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 29.

19

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 29–30.

20

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 29.
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Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 29.
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Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 29–30.
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Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 30.

24

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 30.

25

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 30–31.
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identify cases with discernable victimization.26 They then coded
these cases and used the data to develop a typology of victims that
accounts for why/how victims were victimized, consequences and
punishments, and why/how the U.S. government chose to pursue
prosecution.27 They collected the following: summary information on
the nature of the crime, year, docket number, state, major environmental and non-environmental charging statutes used, penalties assessed, and if each case involved death and/or injury.28 Of the 2,588
cases analyzed, only ninety-three cases had identifiable victims.29
Summative content analysis was used to code case summaries,
with inter-coder reliability evidencing high levels of agreement across
cases (95%).30 Several themes emerged, and Ozymy and Jarrell
explain these findings and provide specific illustrative examples.31
One noteworthy result is the geographic specificity for environmental prosecutions, with “Region 2” (New York and New Jersey) and
“Region 9” (California, Nevada, and Arizona) having the most
prosecutions and “Region 1” (Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut) and “Region 7”
(Nebraska, Kansas, Indiana, and Missouri) having the least.32 Ozymy
and Jarrell also found that many cases included non-environmental
criminal charges (e.g., false statements, fraud, obstruction).33
Ozymy and Jarrell’s findings as to which federal statutes were
used are worthy of retelling, if only to highlight the types of victimizations these crimes involve. The most frequently used federal statute
was the Clean Air Act (CAA) (n = 24, 25.8% of 93 cases).34 Most
CAA violations included illegal asbestos abatement and disposal
and/or negligence for exposing workers to harmful toxic chemicals.35
For example, in the Mountain Aviation case,36 a company and its
president were prosecuted for hiring teenagers to remove asbestos
26

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 31.

27

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 31.

28

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 31.

29

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 31.

30

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 32.

31

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 33–53.

32

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 33–34.

33

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 42.

34

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 34–35, 39.

35

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 35.

36

United States v. Mountain Aviation, Inc., A98CR 00067-001 (D. Alaska June
4, 1998).
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from their building without providing any training or protection, which
resulted in the teenagers inhaling asbestos dust.37
In sixteen of the ninety-three cases (17.2%), defendants were
charged under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA).38 FIFRA violations primarily included selling and applying pesticides in a negligent manner and exposing workers and
bystanders to toxic insecticides.39 For example, Friendly Systems,
Inc. poisoned Native American children in South Dakota when they
used off-label pesticides to sanitize toothbrushes.40
The Clean Water Act (CWA) was used in fourteen of the ninetythree cases (15%), with violations typically including the illegal storage or discharge of waste resulting in injury to workers or other
individuals.41 The most noteworthy CWA violation included charging
Transocean Deepwater, Inc. for their part in the Deepwater Horizon
oil disaster.42
The next most often used federal statute (n = 10; 10.7% of 93
cases) was Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).43
The RCRA regulates storage, transport, and disposal of hazardous
substances. Violations of RCRA can be seen in the prosecution of
the Southern Union Company, which improperly stored mercury,
leading to the contamination of an apartment complex.44 Finally, the
Toxic Substances and Control Act (TSCA), was used in five (5.3%)
cases of exposure to lead-based paint, one of which involved a
child’s death.45
Analyses revealed four types of environmental victims: 1) victims
of company crimes, 2) victims of individual crimes, 3) victims of state
crimes, and 4) victims of occupational crimes.46 In more than half of
the cases, company actions resulted in employee or non-employee
injury or death, with nineteen (20.4%) involving a death and thirtyeight (40.8%) involving an injury attributed to unsafe company
37

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 35.

38

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 35–36.

39

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 36.

40

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 37 (citing United States v. Stewart, No.
2:98CR012 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 23, 1998)).
41

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 37.

42

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 37–38 (citing United States v. Transocean,
Ltd., No. 2:13-CR-00001-JTM-SS (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2013)).
43

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 39.

44

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 40 (citing United States v. Southern Union
Co., No. 1:07CR00134-01S (D.R.I. Oct. 16, 2007)).
45

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 40 (citing United States v. JTA Real Estate
Brokerage and Property, No. 01-123-02-M (D.N.H. Dec. 19, 2001)).
46

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 42–46.
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practices.47 Individual crime victims were victimized directly, either
because of their own actions or the actions of another individual.48
Those injured while carrying out duties of the state only included
one case in which corrections officers ordered inmates to improperly
dispose of toxic chemicals.49 Finally, occupational crime victims
included those injured directly while fulfilling work obligations, rather
than through company negligence.50
Ozymy and Jarrell also categorized the crimes by their
consequences.51 Almost 50% of crimes included toxic exposure,
which was the most common consequence and source of
victimization.52 Explosions were the second most common consequence, accounting for twenty-one injuries and fourteen deaths, and
typically attributed to company or employee negligence.53 Evacuations occurred in at least eleven cases because of company or
employee negligence.54 And lead-based paint exposure was present
in ten cases and was attributed to either company or individual
negligence.55
Finally, Ozymy and Jarrell evaluated cases in terms of
punitiveness.56 Of the ninety-three cases they examined, forty-nine
(52.6%) cases resulted in individual fines for defendants, with total
penalties exceeding $6.2 million.57 Probation was assigned in fortyone (44%) cases for individuals, totaling 1,792 months of probation,
and a total of 1,840 months of prison time was assessed in thirtyfour (36.5%) cases.58 Companies were fined in fifty (53.7%) cases,
totaling over $584 million in fines.59 However, corporate fines are
47

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 42.

48

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 44–45.

49

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 45–46 (citing United States v. Cecil Morgan,
No. CR 94-20061-02 (W.D. La. Dec. 15, 1994)).
50

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 46.

51

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 47–52.

52

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 50–51.

53

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 47–48.

54

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 48–49.

55

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 51–52.

56

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 52–54.

57

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 52.

58

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 52.

59

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 52.
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skewed because of the single $400 million dollar fine levied against
Transocean for the Deepwater Horizon disaster.60
Despite increased interest in criminal enforcement, courts have
been slow to recognize environmental victims, and our understanding of victimization remains limited.61 Four themes derived from
these findings can be used to make general inferences about
environmental prosecution and victimization.62 First, most environmental prosecutions do not include clearly identifiable victims. Only
ninety-three (3.6%) of 2,588 cases involved identifiable victims,
which equates to 2.5 victim-based prosecutions a year, illustrating
how infrequently the EPA acts.63 Second, criminal prosecution for
environmental crimes is more likely when violations result in specific
or large events and serious damage, rather than long-term
ramifications.64 Third, environmental crimes perpetrated by companies result in prosecutions far more often than state crime, selfharm, or individual negligence.65 Finally, like previous findings,66
most cases proceeded against only serious and chronic offenders.67
B. A Knowing Violation: Exploring the History of the
Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Law in the
Midwestern United States
Although environmental regulation and enforcement have been a
concern in the United States since the early 1900s, early federal
statutes were weak, and violations were mostly misdemeanor
offenses.68 It was not until the 1970s that a concerted shift in
environmental law occurred which resulted in a major expansion of
several federal environmental statutes and the addition of felony
provisions.69 This shift coincided with an expansion in enforcement
and a strengthening of both the EPA and the Department of Justice
60

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 52–53 (citing United States v. Transocean,
Ltd., No. 2:13-CR-00001-JTM-SS (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2013)).
61

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 54.

62

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 54.

63

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 54.

64

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 54–55.

65

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 55.

66

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 55 (citing Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental
Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environmental and Criminal Law
Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 494–95 (1996); Joshua Ozymy & Melissa L. Jarrell,
Why Do Regulatory Agencies Punish? The Impact of Political Principals, Agency
Culture, and Transaction Costs in Predicting Environmental Criminal Prosecution
Outcomes in the United States, 33 REV. POL’Y RSCH. 71, 72 (2016).
67

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 55.

68

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 62.

69

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 62.
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(DOJ), with the EPA giving investigators more significant powers and
the DOJ adding more attorneys to prosecute environmental crimes.70
Today, the EPA has significant freedom to pursue cases and recommend them for prosecution, although they arguably still lack sufficient financial and human resources to investigate environmental
crimes in a country as large as the United States.71 Still, as previously noted, most environmental cases are settled civilly.72 This civil
approach to enforcement has called into question the true deterrent
effect of U.S. environmental law, particularly in the Midwestern
United States.73
Environmental law enforcement at both the state and federal levels
is crucial for ensuring compliance and deterring violations; yet, little
research examines if and how environmental laws are enforced.
Specifically, there is scant research on how these laws are enforced
in the Midwestern United States, which prior research identified as
the most active region.74 To address this gap, Ozymy and Jarrell
analyze EPA criminal prosecutions between 1983 and 2019 in twelve
Midwestern states: Illinois, Indiana, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin.75 Ozymy and Jarrell selected 580 prosecutions identified
in these states for analysis, which collectively comprise a distinct
geographic subset of the data collected for their 2020 article.76
Ozymy and Jarrell’s analyses revealed few early prosecutions,
with just a single case adjudicated in 198377 and the scant total of
only twenty-one by 1990.78 But prosecutions steadily increased over
time, with 269 cases prosecuted between 2010 and 2019.79 Ohio (n
= 145) and Missouri (n = 123) had the most prosecutions, followed
by Michigan (n = 72) and Illinois (n = 62), while Kansas (n = 33),
Iowa (n = 33), Indiana (n = 49), Minnesota (n = 27), and Nebraska
(n = 21) fell in the mid-range category, and North Dakota (n = 8),
South Dakota (n = 8), and Wisconsin (n = 9) comprised the lower
70

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 62–63.

71

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 63–64.

72

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 64.

73

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 64–65.

74

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 61; Joshua Ozymy & Melissa Jarrell,
Wielding the Green Stick: Criminal Enforcement at the EPA under the Bush and
Obama Administrations, 24 ENV’T. POL. 38, 45 (2015).
75

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 61.

76

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 65.

77

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 66–67.

78

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 66–67.

79

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 66–67.
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end of the distribution.80 Defendants were charged under several different statutes, with many cases including multiple charges, but the
Clean Water Act (CWA) was used most often (n = 198 cases).81 The
Clean Air Act (CAA) was used in ninety-six cases; the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in seventy-eight; the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) was
used in twenty-seven cases; the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA) in twenty-four cases; and state environmental statutes were
used in eight-two cases.82 Around 35% of all cases (n = 207) included
at least one non-environmental crime charge, with giving false
statements/falsifying records, conspiracy, and fraud being the most
prevalent charges (decreasing in incidence in that order).83
Aggregate monetary penalties totaled over $216 million for
individual offenders and over $3.1 billion for companies.84 Individual
defendants received a total of 14,606 months of probation, 8,255
months of incarceration, and 20,634 hours of community service.85
Companies were assessed 4,805 months of probation.86 Penalties
may seem severe, but five statistical outliers account for a
substantial portion of both monetary fines and greater prison/
probation sentences.87 For example, Volkswagen alone incurred a
$2.8 billion penalty.88
Ozymy and Jarrell’s analyses also revealed that cases could be
ordered around a typology of air, water, and hazardous waste
crimes.89 Water pollution crimes were the most prevalent with 224
cases (about 38%).90 Most of these offenses were charged under
the CWA for crimes like illegally discharging waste and violating
pretreatment standards.91 For example, Shell was charged under the
Refuse Act when a ruptured pipeline between Oklahoma and Illinois
80

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 67.

81

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 67–68.

82

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 67–68.

83

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 68–69.

84

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 69–71.

85

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 69–71.

86

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 69–71.

87

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 71–74.

88

Ozymy and Jarrell, supra note 5, at 71 (citing Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Database: Volkswagen, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://cfpub.epa.gov/complia
nce/criminal_prosecution/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/3QHB-V364] (search in
defendants field for “Volkswagen”; then clink “view” for the case in fiscal year 2017).
89

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 74.

90

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 74.

91

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 74–75.
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dumped 863,268 gallons of oil into a Gasconade River tributary.92
Violations of air pollution standards (n = 111; 19%) were the next
most prevalent type of case.93 These crimes were, mostly, centered
around improper asbestos removal, which is costly and necessitates
the use of licensed professionals and following strict disposal
requirements. 94 Hazardous waste crimes were the third most
prevalent violation, occurring in ninety-seven (16%) cases.95 These
prosecutions primarily included violations of strict “cradle-to-grave”
regulations, which track the creation, storage, transport, and disposal
of hazardous and toxic waste.96 Finally, eighty-one (14%) cases
focused on violations of state-level environmental laws. 97 The
remaining seventy-seven (13%) cases did not fit neatly into one of
the four typologies prevalent in the data.98
Four larger findings can be used to characterize prosecutions in
the Midwest.99 As previously mentioned, one of the bigger themes
that emerged from data analyses is that prosecutions have largely
been infrequent.100 Results show increased enforcement over time,
but the relatively small number of prosecutions suggest most
environmental crimes go unnoticed and unpunished.101 Relatedly,
the second major summary finding illustrates that, even in culturally
homogenous and geographically similar areas, and after accounting
for state and industry variation, large prosecution disparities persist
and suggest enforcement is unequal.102 For instance, Missouri and
Ohio make up 45% of total prosecutions in the dataset; by contrast,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin make up only.04%
combined.103 The third major finding concerns the types of crimes
92

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 75 (citing Summary of Criminal Prosecution
Databases: Shell Pipe Line Corporation, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://cfpub.epa.g
ov/compliance/criminal_prosecution/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/E82T-KWUN]
(search in defendants field for “Shell Pipe”; then clink “view” for the case in fiscal
year 1992).
93

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 76.

94

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 76.

95

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 79.

96

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 79.

97

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 80.

98

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 80.

99

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82.

100

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82.

101

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82; see also Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6,
at 26–28.
102

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82.

103

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82.
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prosecuted.104 More specifically, that most charges were water pollution crimes, followed by air pollution, and hazardous waste crimes.105
A caveat to this finding, though, is that the Midwest may be more
susceptible to water violations because of the proximity to the Great
Lakes and how industries in the area utilize them for commerce.106
The fourth major summative result highlights that companies were
more frequently charged than individuals.107
Ozymy and Jarrell offer three suggestions for improving the
enforcement of U.S. environmental statutes.108 First, we need to
bring greater public awareness to industrial environmental violations,
including more media attention and clearer connections to other
policy concerns that attract more attention, such as the racially
disparate effects of pollution.109 Second, we need to increase the
resources devoted to policing and prosecuting environmental
crimes.110 While the EPA has received greater resources and authorities in recent years, Ozymy and Jarrell argue that there are insufficient prosecutors and special agents dedicated specifically to
environmental crimes; 150 such agents are currently assigned, while
the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990 requires that there be at least
200.111 Third, we need to enhance local stakeholder participation and
community policing of industrial facilities.112 The reason for this is
that it is impossible for state and federal agencies to monitor and
police the large number of facilities operating across the United
States.113 Thus, local monitoring of facilities is necessary and can be
accomplished by expanding reporting and encouraging people and
communities to report violations through tools like the EPA’s “Report
a Violation” webpage, which has generated thirty-five cases and six
referrals for prosecution.114
III. CONCLUSION
Both of Ozymy and Jarrell’s articles clearly illustrate the extent of
104

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82.

105

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82.

106

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82.

107

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82.

108

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82–83.

109

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 83 n.87.

110

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 83.

111

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 13101 to 13109.

112

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 84.

113

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 84.

114

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 84 (citing Enforcement and Compliance
History Online (ECHO): Report a Violation, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://echo.ep
a.gov/report-environmental-violations [https://perma.cc/W6CH-H9BS]).
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U.S. environmental crime victimization and the limited governmental
response. Prosecutions of environmental offenders and enforcement
of environmental laws have increased over time, but we still do not
treat these crimes with the seriousness they deserve.115 We need a
dramatic shift in how we monitor and enforce environmental regulations if we want to have a livable environment in the future.
115

Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 5, at 82; Ozymy & Jarrell, supra note 6, at 26–

28.
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